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Research Report:
How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures
at the Start of Their Cases
Donna Shestowsky

lthough portions of the United States economy have
begun to recover from the economic crisis that the
country experienced from 2007 to 2009, the nation’s
judicial system has rebounded more slowly. Forty-three states
have substantially cut their judicial budgets.1 In many jurisdictions, the waiting time for civil trials in state courts has dramatically increased—in at least one major metropolitan area,
the waiting time for many litigants has risen to five years.2 Budgets for alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) programs have
also shrunk considerably.3 In light of these realities, many litigants struggle to obtain civil justice.
Empirical research designed to elucidate litigants’ preferences for legal procedures can help courts better serve their
constituents moving forward. For example, many courts offer
either mediation or arbitration as the only alternative to trial.
But which of these two procedures do litigants prefer? Procedural preference research can provide such information and
consequently help inform program design. Such research can
also help lawyers be more responsive to their clients’ needs as
they consider their procedural options and better predict the
preferences of opposing parties.
It is important for empirical research to elucidate how litigants perceive procedures ex ante (before a legal procedure
resolves the dispute) as well as how they evaluate them ex post
(after the case has received a final disposition). Ex ante perceptions are relevant for understanding litigants’ viewpoints
regarding how to “fit the forum to the fuss.”4 Research on such
perceptions can help court personnel effectively “market” ADR

A

options to litigants, thereby mitigating burdens related to overstretched budgets, court dockets, and the waiting time for trial.
It can also be useful for anticipating resistance toward, or overeagerness to engage in, certain procedures in light of the caserelated, demographic, or relationship factors at play in a given
dispute. For these reasons, an understanding of litigants’ preexperience conceptualizations of legal procedures should be
considered foundational.
In contrast, litigants’ ex post perceptions are important
because they tend to affect how inclined litigants are to voluntarily comply with the terms of the agreement or decision that
is reached for their case and how willing they are to abide by
the law moving forward.5 Although the architects of court policy are rightfully influenced by multiple factors, research on litigants’ perceptions—both ex ante and ex post—can help to
inform the design and use of procedures that maximize the subjective satisfaction of litigants and increase citizens’ respect for
the legal system.
To contribute to this body of psychological literature, my
research team and I spearheaded the first multi-court study of
how civil litigants assess legal procedures ex ante.6 We noticed
that several aspects of litigant perceptions had not been fully
examined through empirical research. One open issue concerned how litigants compare legal procedures such as mediation, judge trials, and non-binding arbitration. Nearly all of the
past studies had consisted of laboratory research, which typically involved surveying undergraduates who evaluated options
for resolving hypothetical disputes.7 How actual civil litigants

This article was adapted from Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of
Procedural Preference: How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante,
99 IOWA L. REV. 637 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2378622. Additional findings can be found in the original work. The
research was funded by the National Science Foundation under Grant
Number 0920995. The American Bar Association, Section on Litigation, and the Institute for Governmental Affairs at the University of
California, Davis, provided financial support during the first year of
the study. The University of California, Davis, School of Law also provided ongoing financial and human resources to support this project.

the forum to the fuss” through ex ante screening and determination of the most appropriate procedures to be used, based on the
particulars of individual cases. See, e.g., Frank E. A. Sander &
Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994); see
also Timothy Hedeen, Remodeling the Multi-Door Courthouse to
“Fit the Forum to the Folks”: How Screening and Preparation Will
Enhance ADR, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 941, 941 (2012) (proposing a
structural change in the delivery of ADR services through a premediation consultation process of screening and preparation that
focuses not only on disputes but on litigants as well).
5. Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected
Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We
Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 577-79 (2008)
(providing an overview of the relevant findings); see also TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4-5 (2006) (discussing the benefits of voluntary compliance from the perspective of the authorities).
6. We are currently collecting data on the same litigants regarding
their ex post perceptions.
7. See Shestowsky, supra note 5, for review of the relevant literature.

Footnotes
1. Mary McQueen, President, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, National
Public Radio Interview (Oct. 4, 2011).
2. Stephen Stock, California Superior Courts in Crisis, NBC BAY AREA,
July 24, 2013, http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/CaliforniaSuperior-Courts-in-Crisis-216668081.html.
3. See Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of Procedural Preference:
How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV.
637, n.5 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2378622.
4. The idea of “marketing” ADR options to litigants is reminiscent of
Frank Sander’s work during the 1970s, which focused on “fitting

126 Court Review - Volume 50

assess their options with respect to actual cases was not clear.8
To our knowledge, only two past field studies had examined the
ex ante perceptions of real litigants, and both were conducted in
a single jurisdiction and made limited inquiries into litigant
decision-making.9 Another open issue was whether litigants’
attraction to procedures is associated with demographic, relationship or attitudinal factors, or the substantive issues involved
in their cases. Laboratory research on ex ante preferences, and
arguably even lawyer intuition, suggest that many factors influence how desirable litigants perceive procedures to be, including
their culture, race or ethnicity, gender, the role they have in the
case (i.e., defendant or plaintiff), and the causes of action that
are involved.10 A third open issue was whether litigants have a
preference between the two ADR procedures that courts commonly offer—namely, mediation and non-binding arbitration.
Our project differs from past field research on ex ante litigant
assessments of procedures in several ways. First, it surveys litigants from three distinct state court systems, making it the first
multi-jurisdictional study of litigants’ ex ante preferences. Second, the courts from which litigants were recruited offered both
mediation and non-binding arbitration, in addition to trial, for
the same cases. Thus, the study investigates preferences within
a real-world environment while maintaining a “laboratory-like”
setting by keeping the most important variables (i.e., the procedures offered by the courts) relatively constant. Third, compared to earlier research, this work examines how litigants evaluate a much larger variety of procedures and assesses a broader
set of factors that might predict attraction to procedures.
METHOD

Participants were recruited from general jurisdiction trial
courts (the “study courts”) in three states:
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah
(“Utah Court”);11
Superior Court of Solano County, California (“California
Court”);12 and
Fourth Judicial District, Multnomah County, Oregon
(“Oregon Court”).13

8. See Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The DoubleEdged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171,
173 (2005).
9. For review, see Shestowsky, supra note 3, at 651-53.
10. Id.
11. The Utah Court is located in Salt Lake City. In 2010, litigants filed
55,074 civil cases in the Utah Court. See UTAH DIST. COURTS,
FY2010 CASE TYPE BY COURT (2010), available at
http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/files/2010FY/district/3-Summary.pdf.
12. The California Court is located in northern California, with
branches in Fairfield and Vallejo. For the 2010–2011 fiscal year,
the Solano County Court received 13,910 civil filings. JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL., 2012 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATE CASELOAD
TRENDS: 2001–2002 THROUGH 2010–2011, at 94 tbl.4b (2012),
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2012-CourtStatistics-Report.pdf.
13. The Oregon Court is located in Multnomah County. In 2010, the
Oregon Court received 18,203 civil-case filings. OR. JUDICIAL DEP’T,
STATISTICAL REPORT RELATING TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE OF
OREGON, at 2 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://courts.oregon.gov/

For six two-week periods between May 2010 and May 2011,
we identified litigants who met the following study criteria in
each study court: their case must have been filed in one of the
courts during the two-week period and have been eligible for
trial as well as both mediation and non-binding arbitration at
that court. When the court did not provide litigant contact
information, the team researched addresses for the litigants to
prevent the data contamination that may have occurred by
sending the surveys to the attorneys to distribute to their
clients. Surveys were mailed to litigants within three weeks of
the date on which their case was filed. An introductory letter
and consent form explained that they would be compensated
for returning the survey.
The survey collected demographic information (e.g., gender,
age group) about the litigants, the kind of litigants they were
(e.g., whether they were involved in the case as an individual or
were representing a company, organization, or group) as well as
some details about their case (e.g., whether they were the plaintiff, the defendant, or both (in cases involving counter-claims),
the type of legal issues that were involved, whether the parties
had a pre-existing relationship with each other, and how much
they valued a future relationship with the other party). They
rated the confidence they had in their case by providing a 0100% chance estimate of winning their case (“If you go to trial
for this case, what do you think your chances are of ‘winning’?”). They also indicated their impression of the court
where the case was filed (1 = extremely negative to 9 =
extremely positive). See Table 1 for more details regarding the
information that was collected.
Other questions assessed how attractive litigants regarded
the following legal procedures: (1) Attorneys Negotiate without
Clients, (2) Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present, (3) Mediation, (4) Judge Decides without Trial,14 (5) Jury Trial, (6)
Judge Trial, (7) Binding Arbitration, and (8) Non-binding Arbitration. Litigants read brief descriptions of these procedures15 to
ensure construct validity and then rated each in terms of how
attractive they perceived it to be for their own case (1 = not
attractive at all to 9 = extremely attractive).16

OJD/docs/OSCA/2010_Stats_Table_1.pdf.
14. This procedure was described to participants as follows: Sometimes
a judge can decide a case early on, so that a trial is never required.
This is because the judge has determined there is no question
about the facts, and the case can be decided on the basis of law
alone. The lawyers submit documents to the court and may make
a presentation to the judge at a hearing. Clients rarely attend and,
if they do, they do not speak during the hearing. The judge later
announces the outcome in writing, and explains why they decided
as they did. This outcome is based on legal rules or principles. A
party who is dissatisfied with the outcome can appeal it to a higher
court, which will require additional time and proceedings.
15. For a full set of descriptions, see Shestowsky, supra note 3, 701-03.
“Construct validity” refers to the “degree to which certain explanatory concepts or constructs account for performance on [a] test.”
SAMUEL MESSICK, VALIDITY OF TEST INTERPRETATION AND USE 7
(1990), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED395031.pdf.
16. We created three versions of the survey, with the same questions
presented in different orders in each version.
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TABLE 1: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION (CONTINUED)

TABLE 1: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION

FREQUENCY

%

FREQUENCY

%

Litigant Ethnicity/Race

Court Location
California

59

14.3

American Indian or Alaska Native

6

1.5

Oregon

190

46.0

Asian

17

4.1

Utah

155

37.5

Hispanic

12

2.9

9

2.2

Black or African American

20

4.8

Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander

4

1.0

White Non-Hispanic

324

78.5

Missing Data

Role in Case
Defendant Only

156

37.8

Other

16

3.9

Plaintiff Only

235

56.9

Missing Data

14

3.4

Both

12

2.9

Other

1

0.2

Litigant Gender

Missing Data

9

2.2

Female

176

42.6

Male

225

54.5

Missing Data

12

2.9

No

218

52.8

Yes

180

43.6

Missing Data

15

3.6

Yes, Plaintiff’s insurance has an interest

26

6.3

Yes, Defendant’s insurance has an interest

83

20.1

Yes, Both Parties’ insurance have an interest

42

10.2

Party Type (Litigant)
Individual

287

69.5

Company

97

23.5

Group/Organization

27

6.5

Missing Data

6

1.5

Party Type (Opposing Party)
Individual

202

48.9

Company

156

37.8

Group/Organization

32

7.7

Missing Data

30

7.3

Was the Litigant a Defendant or Plaintiff Before?

Relationship with Opposing Party
Before Filing?

Insurance Company has an Interest
in the Outcome?

No, Neither Party’s insurance has an interest

190

46.0

Yes, Defendant Only

52

12.6

Don’t Know

57

13.8

Yes, Plaintiff Only

70

16.9

Missing Data

15

3.6

Yes, Both

69

16.7

No, Neither

176

42.6

Missing Data

46

11.1

18-25

14

3.4

PARTICIPANTS AND TYPES OF CASES

26-35

80

19.4

36-45

74

17.9

46-55

92

22.3

56-65

82

19.9

Four hundred thirteen litigants participated in this study.17
The majority of their cases involved only personal injury
(28.6%) or contracts (24.5%) issues. A variety of other types of
cases were included in the sample: property (11.1%), civil
rights (2.9%), employment (5.3%), medical practice (1.7%),

66-75

48

11.6

76-80

6

1.5

Over 80

5

1.2

Missing Data

12

2.9

Note: N = 413. Missing data indicates litigants for whom a response to
the question was not obtained. Party Type and Opposing Party Type calculations include participants (n = 4 and n = 7, respectively) who indicated that more than one type applied to their case.

Litigant Age Group
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17. Ultimately, the mailings resulted in a 10% response rate. The data set
includes litigants with mailing addresses from 19 states; 7.02% had
addresses from outside of the states where the study courts were
located.

and “other” (10.9%). About one-eighth of cases (12.6%)
involved multiple causes of action.18

FIGURE 1: HOW LITIGANTS EVALUATED THE
ATTRACTIVENESS OF LEGAL PROCEDURES
9

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

8
7
Mean Attractiveness

We used our data to determine (1) litigants’ relative preferences for the various legal procedures and (2) whether casetype, demographic, relationship or attitudinal factors predicted
how desirable litigants regarded each procedure. As with any
empirical study, it is important to keep in mind how to interpret
our findings. First, because ours was not a controlled laboratory
study, our data cannot be used to conclusively determine causal
relationships between litigants’ attraction to certain procedures
and the other factors we measured (e.g., that litigants’ attitudes
toward the court causes their level of attraction to the Judge
Trial, or that being female causes a relative dislike for Binding
Arbitration). Thus, although our interpretations of the findings
are certainly consistent with the analyses that we report, they
should not be taken as evidence that we discovered particular
causal relationships. Second, it is important to note that the
results do not necessarily generalize to how litigants might evaluate these same procedures ex post. Third, although, to our
knowledge, the data collected for this study represents the
largest data set of litigants’ ex ante perceptions of procedures
published to date, the response rate was 10%.19 Notably, and
perhaps expectedly, defendants opted out of the research at
higher rates than plaintiffs did.
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Figure 1. Mean litigant attraction ratings of legal procedures. Error bars are
SEs of the ratings. Reported above each bar is the average litigant rating for
that procedure. Litigants rated their attraction to each procedure using a 9point Likert scale.

Litigants evaluated the attractiveness of each procedure for
their case (1 = not attractive at all to 9 = extremely attractive).
To determine their relative preferences, we compared how
attractive they found the Judge Trial—the default legal procedure20—to the other options. Litigants found the Judge Trial
significantly more attractive than all other examined procedures except for Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present and
Mediation. Litigant attraction to these two procedures did not
significantly differ from that of the Judge Trial. See Figure 1.
Additional analyses revealed that litigants preferred Mediation to all other procedures except for the Judge Trial and
Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present (whose attractiveness
ratings did not significantly differ from that of Mediation).
They also liked Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present more
than all of the other procedures except for the Judge Trial and

Mediation (whose attractiveness ratings did not significantly
differ from that of Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present).
Thus, litigants preferred the Judge Trial, Mediation, and Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present to all other examined procedures,21 and within this group of best-liked procedures, they
did not have a statistically significant preference.
Together, these findings have important implications for
courts because court administrators who want to encourage
the use of their voluntary programs should strive not only to
offer ADR options that litigants find especially appealing relative to each other, but ones that litigants find more appealing
(or at least not significantly less appealing) than trial itself, ex
ante. Our study found that not only did litigants prefer Mediation to Non-binding Arbitration, but they liked Mediation significantly more than the Jury Trial (and viewed the attractiveness of Mediation and the Judge trial as statistically equivalent). By contrast, litigants found Non-binding Arbitration significantly less appealing than both the Judge and Jury Trial.22
From this perspective, Mediation seems like a better choice for

18. The percentages were calculated using n = 403, due to missing data
regarding case types.
19. As calculated, the 10% response rate likely reflects a gross underestimate of the true response rate and may significantly understate
the representativeness of the sample. Significant research was often
required to locate the addresses of litigants; it is possible that in
many cases none of the addresses used to reach a particular litigant
were correct, and thus, we should not have expected any of our
attempts to yield a completed survey. A 10% response rate is not
unusual for a survey study of laypeople who are contacted randomly through the mail.
20. A civil litigant must take affirmative action to demand a jury trial.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 631(f) (West 2012) (stating that “A
party waives trial by jury . . . (4) By failing to announce that a jury
is required, at the time the cause is first set for trial . . . or within

five days after notice of setting . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 52.570
(West 2013) (stating that “[I]f either party . . . demands a jury trial
and deposits with the justice such trial fee as is required . . . the
issue must be tried by a jury and not the justice; but otherwise it
must be tried by the justice”); UTAH R. CIV. P. 38(b) (stating that
“Any party may demand a trial by jury . . . not later than 10 days
after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue”).
21. Hierarchical Linear Model analysis using Attorneys Negotiate with
Clients Present as the reference group confirmed this conclusion.
The results of this analysis are on file with the author. Other preference results are reported in Shestowsky, supra note 3 at 663-66.
22. See Shestowsky, supra note 3, at 663-64 (reporting that litigants
preferred the Judge Trial to Non-binding Arbitration). A followup analysis demonstrated that litigants also preferred the Jury
Trial to Non-binding Arbitration, t (406) = 3.45, p = .001.

A. PROCEDURAL PREFERENCES
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voluntary programs. Insofar as litigants might be more apt to
participate in good faith in settlement procedures they find
especially attractive, the fact that litigants favored Mediation to
Non-binding Arbitration could be an important finding for
mandatory programs as well.
Litigants also preferred negotiations that would include the
attorneys along with their clients to negotiations that would
involve only the attorneys. They liked Mediation as much as
the former but significantly more than the latter. This finding—
along with the fact that litigants preferred Mediation to all adjudicative procedures except the Judge Trial—suggests that they
want to be present for, and have the option to informally participate in, the resolution process.23 This finding may come as a
surprise to attorneys who assume that they should conduct settlement discussions on their own. Although case strategy might
sometimes call for excluding litigants from settlement negotiations, lawyers might anticipate a desire on the part of clients to
observe or participate in the discussions themselves and should
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of that option in light
of their particular case.
Litigants also liked the Judge Trial significantly more than
the Jury Trial. At this juncture, explanations for this finding are
speculative. Perhaps litigants prefer the judge as fact-finder
based on negative depictions of jury trials in the mainstream
American media.24 Alternatively, some litigants may believe that
judges are better able to keep an open mind during the trial and
not predetermine the outcome.25 Other litigants may value
expediency and suspect that bench trials are more likely to promote it.26 Future research should seek to explore the greater
enthusiasm for the Judge Trial as compared to the Jury Trial.
B. PREDICTORS OF ATTRACTION TO SPECIFIC
PROCEDURES
One goal of this project was to determine whether case-type,
demographic, relationship or attitudinal variables predicted litigants’ attraction to each procedure. To accomplish this goal, we

23. The “shuttle” model of mediation was not mentioned in the
description of Mediation that was provided to the participants. See
Shestowsky, supra note 3, at Appendix D. Shuttle mediation occurs
when mediators meet with the parties separately rather than in
joint session and “shuttle’ information back and forth between the
parties in an effort to reach an agreement.
24. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Jury Jokes and Legal Culture, CORNELL LAW
FACULTY PUBLICATIONS, Paper 635 (2013) (conducting a systemic
analysis of a body of jokes about the jury system, collected from a
variety of print and online sources).
25. Studies show that jurors tend to discuss the case before deliberation, despite admonition to the contrary. See Natasha K. Lakamp,
Deliberating Juror Predeliberation Discussions: Should California Follow the Arizona Model?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 845, 853-54 (1998).
26. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 131 (2002) (explaining that the waiting
time for a judge’s trial and decision in federal court is shorter than
the waiting time in the jury queue).
27. To explore this issue, simultaneous multiple regression analyses
were conducted using the attraction rating for each procedure as
the outcome variable and a series of case-type, demographic, relationship, and attitudinal variables as predictors. Multiple regres-
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TABLE 2: VARIABLES USED AS PREDICTORS

VARIABLE NAME

LEVELS OF VARIABLE

Case Type/
Substantive Issue

personal injury, contract, employment, property, other,
or two or more case types

Role in Case
Party Type
Opposing Party Type

defendant, plaintiff, or both
individual, company, or group or organization
individual, company, or group or organization

Defendant or
Plaintiff Before

whether the litigant had been involved as either a
defendant or plaintiff in a previous case; yes or no

Age Group

whether the litigant was 18–25, 26–35, 36–45,
46–55, 56–65, 66–75, 76–80, or over 80

Race
Gender

white/Caucasian or other
male or female

Relationship Before
Filing

whether the litigant knew or had a relationship with
the opposing party before the case was filed; yes or no

Insurance

whether an insurance company had any interest in the
outcome of the case; yes or no

Importance of Future
Relationship

1 to 5 rating of the importance of having a relationship with the opposing party in the future; 1 = not at
all important, 5 = extremely important

Confindence in Trial Win
Court Location

0–100% estimate of chances of winning at trial
California, Oregon, or Utah

Impression of Court

1 to 9 rating of the litigant’s impression of the court
where the case has been filed; 1 = extremely negative, 9 = extremely positive

used multiple regression analysis. The variables used as predictors are catalogued in Table 2.27 The model significantly predicted how attracted litigants were to every legal procedure
except for Mediation and Non-binding Arbitration. The latter
point suggests that court personnel can choose to offer one of
these two procedures without fearing (at least in light of the
predictor variables that we examined) that they will inadver-

sion is a common type of analysis used to predict an outcome (in
this case, the attractiveness rating for a procedure) based on multiple predictor variables. For each procedure, the intercept of the
regression models represents the mean attractiveness of the reference group. Thus, significant nominal predictors in the regression
model indicate groups within the variable that are associated with
a significant change in the attractiveness rating for a procedure
compared to the reference group’s average attractiveness rating for
that procedure. Similarly, significant continuous predictor variables are variables for which changes in the outcome variable correspond significantly with changes in the predictor. The reference
group used in our model consisted of individual white males,
between 18 and 25 years of age, who have an individual opposing
party with whom they did not have a relationship before the lawsuit and have no interest in having a future relationship, who have
a personal injury case, where an insurance company had no interest in the outcome of the case, who have not had experience as
either a plaintiff or defendant before, who have zero expectancy of
winning in trial, who filed in Oregon, who are plaintiffs in the current case, and who have an extremely negative perception of the
court where their case is filed.

TABLE 3
ATTYS
NEGOTIATE W/O
CLIENTS PRESENT

ATTYS
NEGOTIATE W/
CLIENTS PRESENT

NON-BINDING BINDING
ARBITRATION ARBITRATION

Litigants whose cases
concerned personal
injury issues only liked
this option less than
those with “other” case
types

Case Type/
Substantive
Issue

JUDGE DECIDES
W/O TRIAL

JUDGE TRIAL

JURY TRIAL

Litigants with 2+ case
types liked this
option more than
those whose cases
concerned personal
injury issues only

Litigants with 2+ case
types liked the judge
trial more than those
whose cases concerned
personal injury issues
only

Litigants whose cases
involved property
issues only liked the
jury trial less than
those whose cases
concerned personal
injury issues only

Litigants acting as
both plaintiff and
defendant liked binding arbitration more
than those acting as
plaintiff only

Role in Case

Party Type

MEDIATION

Companies liked this
option more than
individuals

Groups and organizations liked this option
less than individuals

Opposing
Party Type

Those opposing a
company liked
binding arbitration
more than those
opposing an
individual

Defendant
or Plaintiff
Before

Repeat litigants liked
binding arbitration
more than first-time
litigants

Litigants liked the
jury trial more when
the opposing party
was a group or
organization vs. an
individual

Those who had a preRelationship vious relationship with
opposing party liked
Before
this option less than
those who did not
Women liked binding
arbitration less than
men

Gender

Women liked the
jury trial less than
men

Race
Age Group

Younger litigants liked
this option more than
older litigants

Insurance

Those reporting that an
insurance company had
an interest in the case
liked this option more
than those who did not

Future
Relationship

Those who desired a
future relationship with
the opposing party liked
this option more than
those who did not

Confidence
in Trial Win

The more confidence
litigants had in their
case, the less they
liked this option

The more confidence
they had in their
case, the more they
liked this option

The more confidence
they had in their case,
the more they liked
the judge trial

CA litigants liked the
jury trial less than
OR litigants

Court
Location
Impression
of Court

The more confidence
they had in their
case, the more they
liked the jury trial

The more favorably
the litigants viewed
the court, the more
they liked this option

The more favorably
litigants viewed the
court, the more they
liked this option

The more favorably litigants viewed the
court, the more they
liked the judge trial
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tently favor the predilections of a subset of the litigants they
serve. Table 3 reports the statistically significant predictors for
each procedure. Some of these findings are especially worthy of
discussion.
1. Repeat Litigants Liked Binding Arbitration More Than
First-Time Litigants
Binding Arbitration was the only procedure for which attraction was significantly associated with litigants’ past litigation
experience. Specifically, repeat litigants liked Binding Arbitration more than their first-time counterparts. This finding resonates with empirical research suggesting that Binding Arbitration awards tend to favor repeat players.28 It also aligns with the
notion that repeat litigants are more likely to appreciate the
hardship of protracted discovery and the threat of an appeal following a trial. This appreciation might lead repeat litigants to
prefer Binding Arbitration because it can limit the likelihood of
both extensive discovery and appeals. In light of this finding,
lawyers might attempt to “even the information playing field”
by having early discussions about the possible advantages associated with Binding Arbitration, even for cases already filed in
court. Courts, too, can provide such information to litigants on
their websites or in informational material that explains different alternatives to trial.
The comparative benefits of Binding Arbitration may be mitigated in large commercial disputes, which could explain why
companies did not like Binding Arbitration significantly more
than individual litigants did. Such disputes tend to introduce
costs traditionally associated with “big case” litigation.29 What is
unexpected is that litigants whose opposing party was a company liked Binding Arbitration more than litigants who opposed
an individual. This result is surprising given the bad press concerning consumer and employment arbitration, which typically
involves cases wherein an individual opposes a corporation.
2. Confidence in Trial Win was Associated with Attraction
to Court-Sponsored Adjudicative Procedures
The more confidence that litigants expressed regarding a
trial win, the more they liked the Judge Decides without Trial,
Jury Trial, and Judge Trial options. One interpretation of this
pattern is that the more confident litigants were about their

28. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts,
and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham, The Repeat Player
Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997).
29. See PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS, COST-EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: KEY STEPS FOR BUSINESS USERS, COUNSEL, ARBITRATORS &
ARBITRATION PROVIDER INSTITUTIONS 6 (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al.
eds., College of Commercial Arbitrators 2010), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/corporate/docs/2
011-cle-materials/10-Prevent-the-Runaway/10c-protocols-expe
ditious.pdf (“Although many arbitrators and some arbitration rules
aim to hold the line on excessive discovery, it is not unusual for
legal advocates to agree to litigation-like procedures for discovery,
even to the extent of employing standard civil procedural rules.”).
30. This interpretation resonates with laboratory research suggesting
that when participants have a strong case, they favor procedures in
which a third party has decision control. See, e.g., Larry B. Heuer
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case, the more they expected jurors and judges to feel positively
about their case too, and vice versa.
The only other procedure significantly associated with trialwin estimates was Attorneys Negotiate without the Clients. The
more litigants believed they would win at trial, the less they
wanted a negotiation that opened the door for compromise if
they would not be present for settlement discussions.30 The fact
that their estimates of success at trial were not associated with
how favorably they regarded the other procedures—including
trial-like Binding Arbitration—suggests that they were more
agnostic about whether these options would produce results
that reflected their own predictions.
From a psychological perspective, litigants’ attraction to
court-sponsored adjudication as a function of the confidence
they have in their case might be due in part to the egocentric
bias. The egocentric bias, which is observed when individuals
construe information in a self-serving way, can lead litigants to
believe their case is much stronger than it is. In our study, 57%
of litigants thought they had at least a 90% chance of prevailing
at trial, and 24% believed they had a 100% chance. Only 16%
thought they had at most a 50% chance of winning. The fact
that higher confidence was associated with greater interest in
time-consuming and expensive procedures such as jury and
judge trials reinforces the importance of lawyers having early
discussions about procedures with their clients. Conversations
about the risks (as well as the financial and emotional costs)
associated with trial might provide litigants a broader perspective from which to consider their options. Courts can encourage such litigant education by enacting court rules that require
lawyers to have such discussions early in the litigation process,
and can reinforce it themselves via pamphlets or court websites.
The latter set of options would be especially important for litigants who represent themselves.
3. Women Liked Jury Trial and Binding Arbitration Less
Than Men
Another intriguing finding that emerged was that women
liked the Jury Trial and Binding Arbitration less than men did.
In fact, these procedures were the only ones for which gender
was found to significantly predict procedure attraction. In light
of research suggesting that women favor conflict avoidance,31

& Steven Penrod, Procedural Preference as a Function of Conflict
Intensity, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700, 704 (1986)
(reporting on laboratory research in which they found “unequivocal support” for the notion “that disputants with a strong case . . .
prefer the autocratic and arbitration procedures, whereas their
weak-case counterparts . . . prefer the moot, mediation, and bargaining procedures”).
31. Some research has found that women exhibit enhanced concern for
the other party, a greater willingness to make concessions, and a
preference for collaborative strategies. See, e.g., Kwok Leung &
Michael Harris Bond, Effects of Cultural Femininity on Preferences
for Methods of Conflict Processing: A Cross-Cultural Study, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 388 (1990); Christine Rack,
Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority Bargaining Patterns in
the MetroCourt Study, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 211, 220-24
(1999).

this pattern makes sense. What is unexpected, however, is that
no gender difference emerged with regard to the Judge Trial,
which is also adversarial in character. An implication of the lack
of gender differences in this category is that women find an
exception for Judge Trials compared to these other forms of
adjudication.
4. Personal Injury Litigants Liked Jury Trial More Than
Property Litigants, but Case Type Was Not a Major
Predictor Otherwise
Litigants whose cases concerned personal injury matters
only liked the Jury Trial significantly more than those whose
cases involved property issues only. This finding fits with the
widely held perception that jury sympathy in personal injury
cases results in high damage awards to plaintiffs.32 Yet, the
appeal of the Jury Trial was not higher for plaintiffs than defendants. This pattern is curious until one considers that attraction
to the Jury Trial was found to be related to confidence (i.e.,
higher confidence was associated with greater attraction to the
Jury Trial, and vice versa). Thus, it is possible that plaintiffs and
defendants in personal injury cases were equally attracted to
the Jury Trial but that their confidence in a trial win better
explained how attracted they were to this procedure. A followup analysis designed to test this possibility revealed that the
relation between attraction to the Jury Trial and confidence in a
trial win for personal injury litigants did not differ significantly
between plaintiffs and defendants.33 This result supports the
notion that litigants’ attraction to the Jury Trial in personal
injury cases was better explained by the confidence they had in
their case than by their role as either a plaintiff or defendant.
Case type mattered in relatively few other instances. Those
whose cases concerned personal injury issues only liked the
Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present option less than those
with other kinds of cases and liked the Judge Decides without
Trial option and the Judge Trial significantly less than those
with multiple causes of action. The latter result suggests that
those with more substantively complicated disputes valued the
prospect of having a judge decide their case more than did
those whose cases concerned personal injury matters only.
5. Relationship Variables Were Associated with Attraction
to the Negotiation Options, but Not with Attraction to
Adversarial Procedures such as Binding Arbitration or
Trial
An interesting pattern emerged regarding the parties’ relationship with one another and how they perceived the two

32. See Alissa J. Strong, “But He Told Me It Was Safe!”: The Expanding
Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 105, 142
(2009) (“A problem that arises in personal injury cases is that
juries sympathize with and strongly desire to compensate the victim.”). But see Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability:
Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1293 (1999)
(“It is widely believed that plaintiffs benefit from jury sympathies.
Yet, an increasing body of evidence suggests that jurors begin their
job favoring tort defendants and doubting the motives of personal
injury plaintiffs . . . .”).
33. See Shestowsky, supra note 3, at 685.
34. Some empirical research suggests that trial has more of a negative

negotiation options. Litigants who had a pre-existing relationship with the opposing party liked Attorneys Negotiate without
the Clients Present less than those who did not, and vice versa.
But those with pre-existing relationships did not differ from litigants without one in terms of how much they liked the Attorneys Negotiate with the Clients Present option. This somewhat
counterintuitive pattern suggests that although litigants with a
relationship history were agnostic about the negotiations that
would allow them to interact with the other party, the idea of
negotiations that would take place without them was relatively
unappealing. By contrast, the more litigants valued a future relationship with the other party, the more they liked Attorneys
Negotiate with the Clients Present, and vice versa. Thus, the
more litigants desired a future relationship, the more interested
they were in informally collaborating to resolve the conflict.
Although one might intuit that the more interested litigants
are in a future relationship with the opposing party, the less
interested they would be in adjudicative or adversarial procedures (i.e., Judge Trial, Jury Trial, Judge Decides without Trial,
and Binding Arbitration), the data did not support this theory.
Accordingly, these findings suggest that litigants might not
appreciate the negative effects that such procedures might have
on their relationships34 or that they expect the benefits of having a third party decide their case to outweigh any negative consequences.
6. Court Impressions Related to Attraction to Judicial
Procedures
The more favorably the litigants rated the court where their
case was filed, the more they liked the two options that granted
decision control to a judge—namely, the Judge Trial and Judge
Decides without Trial. The less favorably they viewed the court,
the less attracted they were to these two options. This pattern
resonates with findings by Tom Tyler and others, suggesting
that greater perceived institutional legitimacy is associated with
a greater preference for, and acceptance of, court decisions.35
The only other procedure that was significantly associated with
litigants’ regard for the court was Attorneys Negotiate without
the Clients Present: the more litigants liked the court, the more
they liked this procedure, and vice versa.
7. Demographic Variables
Surprisingly, the findings suggest that factors that previous
scholars have speculated or observed to be associated with procedural preferences were rarely, if ever, significant predictors of
attraction to procedures. For example, litigants’ role in the case

impact on underlying relationships between the parties than mediation. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims
Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237,
256-68 (1981); Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in the
Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and Case Characteristics,
29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 351, 354-58 (1995). But see RICHARD J.
MAIMAN, AN EVALUATION OF SELECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN THE
MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT 7-9, 35, 37 (1997) (finding that litigants were as likely to report that mediation had not improved
their relationship as to indicate that it had).
35. See Tyler, supra note 5, at 25.
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was statistically significant only for Binding Arbitration (i.e., litigants acting as both a plaintiff and defendant liked Binding
Arbitration more than those acting only as plaintiffs), and court
location was a significant predictor only for the Jury Trial (i.e.,
those with cases in California liked the Jury Trial less than those
with cases in Oregon).
Even though previous studies found some factors to be predictive when evaluated individually, the overall pattern suggests
that when a multitude of case-type, demographic, relationship,
and attitudinal factors are considered simultaneously, relatively
few may actually be associated with attraction to procedures.
This finding is likely to come as a surprise to lawyers or court
administrators who have strong views regarding which procedure is likely to appeal to a “certain kind of litigant” or “someone with a certain kind of case.”
CONCLUSION

claims due to noncompliance with settlement agreements. This
scenario would result in diminished demand for scarce court
resources. Moreover, when people regard the government as
offering subjectively attractive and fair procedures, they subsequently demonstrate greater respect for the legal system and
tend to more readily comply with even unrelated laws and regulations.38 Courts undoubtedly benefit from such voluntary
compliance with the law. Thus, as applied to court-connected
programs, this kind of empirical research can have important
implications for governments stricken by budgetary crises. By
better understanding litigants’ preferences and designing their
programs accordingly, governments might be able to reduce
some of the challenges associated with maintaining the civil
justice system.
Further research on litigants’ perceptions of procedures can
continue to fill gaps in the literature in ways that will be useful
to lawyers as they serve their clients, as well to court policy.
Ultimately, the advancement of procedural justice in light of litigants’ preferences will depend on legal actors doing their part
to implement such research.

An important conclusion from this study is that litigants do
indeed have procedural preferences. They have great enthusiasm for procedures that theoretically provide litigants with the
opportunity for direct participation in the resolution of their
cases—namely, Mediation and negotiations that include the
parties along with their attorneys. They also have great interest
in the Judge Trial, which might reflect respect for authority and
perceived procedural fairness through the democratic functioning of the courts. In terms of court-connected ADR, our findings support the choice of Mediation over Non-binding Arbitration.36
To the extent that lawyers’ attitudes toward procedures differ
from those of litigants, some of these differences might be due
to litigants’ misconceptions about those procedures, whereas
others might reflect incorrect assumptions that lawyers have
about how litigants view those same options. Rather than relying on their own intuitions about the litigant point-of-view,
legal actors could use research findings such as those presented
here to anticipate how litigants will perceive their options as a
function of factors such as how much litigants value a future
relationship with the other party or their perception of the
court where their case was filed.
More globally, using research to uncover litigants’ perceptions of procedures could lead to a more nuanced understanding of the need for court intervention in the regulation of disputes in the first place. Past research suggests that litigants are
less likely to continue their dispute, and more likely to voluntarily comply with the terms of settlement agreements, when
they are satisfied with the legal procedures used to resolve their
dispute.37 Thus, offering litigants ADR options that they find
subjectively attractive could lead to fewer breach-of-contract
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36. See supra Figure 1.
37. See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in
Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 11, 20-22 (1984) (concluding that litigants in consensual procedures such as mediation are more likely to perceive
the outcome as fair and just and, subsequently, are more likely to
comply with the outcome than in adjudicated cases); Mark S.
Umbreit et al., Victim-Offender Mediation: Three Decades of Practice
and Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 298 (2004) (concluding

that offenders who participate in programs that offer them more
opportunity to shape the outcome are more likely to comply with
the outcome and are less likely to re-offend than those who engage
in procedures that are more adjudicative).
38. As Tom Tyler has argued, on the basis of compelling empirical
research, procedures that subjectively appeal to litigants can
inspire them to “obey the law” and reduce the need for governmental intervention to ensure legal compliance. See Tyler, supra
note 5, at 3-4, 62.
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